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CONGRESS AND THE TREATY POWER:
AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST UNILATERAL
PRESIDENTIAL TERMINATION OF THE ABM TREATY*
Christopher C. Sabis**
1. INTRODUCTION
Despite over 200 years of American legal jurisprudence and political
precedent, the vital question of how the United States can legally terminate
international treaties under the Constitution remains undecided. The Constitution
of the United States is silent on this issue. Historically, the executive and
legislative branches have each been inconsistent at best in their approaches to
treaty termination. The Supreme Court balked in 1979 when given the opportunity
to settle the issue, splitting badly and issuing no majority opinion. Academics
have written widely on the topic, but with diverse approaches, considerations, and
conclusions.
With this history of indecision and confusion, what proponents of legislative
power might consider a worst-case scenario has unfolded. A president elected
without a majority of the popular vote has pulled the United States out of a major
nuclear arms control treaty that has been in force since 1972. To further
complicate the scenario, the pullout occurred in the wake of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. While the popularity that traditionally accompanies an
American president during wartime has minimized the domestic political dissent
surrounding the withdrawal, the legal questions remain.
* The author dedicates this paper to the memory of his beloved grandfather Edward Ciarleglio (1915-
2002). "[H]e was an orphan...He was a strong-willed man, yet a gentle man... He was intelligent and
smart, not school smart but self-taught. His mind was a sponge that eagerly soaked up every written
word. Only when his eyes could no longer see did he lay down his books... He was a Marine who
enlisted when others were called to serve... He was an intricate man who in some ways was difficult to
know... I pray that you have found peace in the hands of God. May he bless you and keep you
forever." Joyce E. Sabis, Eulogy for Edward Ciarleglio (Aug. 26, 2002). Edward, you personified an
lnvictus-like spirit. May the lessons you tried to teach enlighten the happy few who had the privilege of
your company, counsel, and love.
"" J.D., Georgetown University Law Center 2003. Chris would like to thank Professor David Koplow
for suggesting this topic and commenting on multiple drafts. Chris would also like to thank the
attorneys representing the members of Congress in Kucinich v. Bush for allowing him to help in a very
small way with their preparation of that case, especially John Burroughs, Esq., Peter Weiss, Esq., and
Professor Bruce Ackerman, Esq. Finally, Chris would like to acknowledge the Congressman who filed
suit on this issue, showing political courage during an important period in our nation's history.
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The purpose of this paper is to add a new perspective to the debate over the
power to terminate treaties in the United States. Following this introduction, the
second section of this paper will provide background and a much abbreviated
policy analysis of the treaty at issue. This paper's third section will summarize the
current law governing treaty withdrawal, including the seminal case of Goldwater
v. Carter,' and illustrate why this law does not effectively support the proposition
that a President can terminate a treaty without Congressional action.
Once this analysis is completed, the fourth section of this paper provides
originalist arguments for and against a legislative role in treaty termination, and a
conclusion consistent with both policy considerations and intent of the Framers of
the Constitution. While the majority and dissent in Goldwater v. Carter, and past
academic works on the issue, have made practically every textual and policy
argument feasible, this paper will analyze both direct and indirect originalist
evidence from sources such as The Federalist and The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787. The paper will also put these arguments in the present
context and illustrate why the policy concerns of the Framers are still relevant
today. In its final section, the paper analyzes the options Congress had in
addressing the termination of the ABM Treaty, and has in looking ahead to the
potential termination of future treaties, and recommends a course of action based
on the current legal and political climate.
In summary, this paper argues that terminating an international treaty is too
important to world stability and to the national character of the United States to
leave in the hands of a single individual (or party). If the Constitution were to
permit the executive branch to terminate a treaty, it would allow one individual to
destroy legally binding multilateral agreements on a whim, or in a moment of
intense pressure. The termination of a treaty would be no different from that of an
executive agreement. Such a construction of the Constitution would also eliminate
the formal dialogue and debates that provide a check against the impetuousness of
the party in power. Requiring an Act of Congress to terminate a treaty makes
sense on legal, historical, policy, and political levels.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The ABM Treaty and its History
On October 3, 1972, the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems (hereinafter "ABM Treaty") went into force.2 The parties agreed to limit
themselves to two ABM deployment areas, and further agreed that these areas
would be located so that they could not provide a full national defense, nor the
1. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
2. Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, Oct. 3, 1972, U.S.-U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435
[hereinafter ABM Treaty].
VOL. 31:2
CONGRESS AND THE TREATY POWER
basis for developing one.3 The treaty went on to prescribe the possible locations
4for the two systems and the quantity of missiles that could be present at each one.
The general idea behind these limitations was to maintain the doctrine of "mutual
assured destruction" and, consequently, the balance of power.5 If one nation
developed a defensive system that would render the other nation's nuclear arsenal
useless, the theory held, that nation would no longer fear retaliation upon
launching a first strike.
Two provisions of the ABM Treaty are of paramount importance. The first,
Article I, Paragraph 2, provides the limitation that prompted President George W.
Bush's desire to withdraw. The language reads, "Each Party undertakes not to
deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide
a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an
individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.",
6
President Bush believes that this provision is fatal to his plans to develop a
National Missile Defense system (hereinafter, NMD), an idea with its roots in the
Reagan Administration's "Star Wars."7 Further discussion of this system and the
arguments for and against it follow in the next part of this section.
The second relevant section of the ABM treaty bears on the legality of United
States withdrawal. Paragraph II of Article XV reads:
Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter
of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its
decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
8
This Article raises several questions. Does this clause give the President of
the United States the legal authority to terminate the ABM Treaty unilaterally,
without any action from Congress?9 What are "extraordinary events?" What are a
nation's "supreme interests?" Did the Senate, in giving its consent to a treaty with
this escape clause, waive any rights it has under the Constitution to participate in
3. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 1, Ill.
4. See id. at art. Ill.
5. See, e.g., Jack Spencer, Editorial, ABM Treaty Exit Makes Us Safer, BALT. SUN, Dec. 28,
2001, at 15A.
6. ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 1.
7. See Editorial, More Trouble For Star Wars, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 7, 2002, at A6.
8. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XV. It is common for modem treaties to contain such
termination provisions. Thus, the issue discussed in this paper is important, not just in this case, but for
future potential treaty termination procedures.
9. Some commentators have maintained that it does. See, e.g., Steven Mufson and Dana
Milbank, U.S. Sets Missile Treaty Pullout; Bush to Go Ahead With Defense Tests, WASH. POST, Dec.
14, 2001, at A01. While the Post provides no reason for this conclusion, the DC Circuit made a similar
argument in Goldwater v. Carter. See infra notes 61-68 and accompanying text of this paper for
analysis and debunking of this argument.
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the decision to withdraw from the Treaty? ° Would such a waiver also apply to the
House of Representatives? These questions are all important to the analysis of the
issue of treaty termination as it applies to this particular agreement.
B. Termination of the ABM Treaty.
i. Facts
On December 13, 2001, at 4:30 a.m. ET, the United States Ambassador to
Moscow delivered formal word to Russia that President Bush was giving 6 months
notice of United States termination of the ABM Treaty, invoking Article XV of
that document. " While Bush did not formalize this decision until December 13, he
had been considering it long before that date. 12 Secretary of State Colin Powell,
throughout that year, had been in discussions with Russian President Vladimir
Putin in an attempt to convince him that the termination of the ABM Treaty was in
the best interests of both nations; these overtures failed.' 3 "This step was not a
surprise for us," President Putin reflected following Bush's announcement,
"However, we consider it a mistake."'
14
The notice of termination also came without the consent or concurrence of
either house of Congress.'" Bush maintained that the executive branch alone had
the power to terminate treaties between the United States and foreign powers.
However, many members of Congress expressed concern about the president's
decision,16 and some legal scholars questioned the legality of the withdrawal. '
7
2. Policy Arguments
While the policy arguments for and against adhering to the ABM Treaty are
not determinant of the legal issues of unilateral presidential termination, they do
provide a context in which to frame constitutional arguments for and against that
power.' 8 The fact that there are different positions on the issue provides a reason
to scrutinize the methods used to make a final decision on the termination of the
10. See Mufson, supra note 9.
11. See Barry Schweid, Associated Press, ABCNews.com Dec. 13, 2001, at http://abcnews.go.
com/sections/politics/DailyNews/bushabm01 1213.html (last visited Oct. 31,2002).
12. See Mufson, supra note 9.
13. See David E. Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, US. to Pull Out of ABM Treaty, Clearing Path
for Antimissile Tests, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2001, at Al.
14. America Withdraws From ABM Treaty, BBC News, Dec. 13, 2001, available at http://news.
bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/americas/newsid1707000/1707812.stm (last visited Oct. 31, 2002).
15. See Susan Milligan, Bush Gives Notice US to Drop ABM Pact, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 14,
2001, at A31.
16. See, e.g., Mufson, supra note 9.
17. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Opinion, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2001, at M5.
18. These arguments are not exhaustive of those presented in the debate over the ABM Treaty.
The positions mentioned are some of the major arguments and are included here simply to provide very
basic background information and context.
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Treaty, since the final decision will be binding and will affect the international
reputation of the United States.
a. Arguments for Termination
President Bush and those who support the decision to terminate the ABM
Treaty argue that it is a relic; it is an anachronism from a Cold War over a decade
past.' 9 This belief seemed to gain validity after the attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. While these were not missile
strikes, supporters of the termination argue that no one knows what methods
terrorists may use in the future, and that there is a threat of a nuclear attack from
"rogue states.,,20 They maintain that developing nations like North Korea would
not tax their economies by making weapons that the United States could destroy
before they reach their targets.2' In this way, NMD will promote nonproliferation
and protect the United States from a missile attack from a rogue-state. "I have
concluded," said President Bush, "the ABM Treaty hinders our government's
ability to develop ways to protect our people from future terrorist or rogue-state
missile attacks., 22 "It's a great move at a great time," believes Kenneth Adelman,
Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency under Ronald Reagan, "It
shows we are sensitive to the greatest terrorist threat to the country, which is
weapons of mass destruction on top of ballistic missiles. 23
When confronted with the fear that the destruction of the Treaty will lead to a
renewed arms race, particularly with Russian and China, proponents of the missile
defense system give different responses. Some maintain that the ABM Treaty did
not work as an arms reduction measure even when it was timely.24 They point to
the fact that, after the signing of the ABM Treaty, the Soviet ballistic missile
arsenal grew 10,000 missiles by 1990, while the number of U.S. missiles also
19. This is not a new argument. After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Clinton Administration was
confronted with the question of whether the ABM Treaty was legally dissolved by the breakup, or
whether the Treaty applied to the new relationship between Russia and the United States. While the
Clinton Administration decided the Treaty was still valid, there are those who have argued that the
abrogation by President Bush is meaningless because the ABM Treaty is inapplicable. See George
Miron, Did the ABM Treaty of 1972 Remain in Force After the USSR Ceased to Exist in December
1991 and Did It Become a Treaty Between the United States and the Russian Federation?, 17 Am. U.
INT'L L. REV. 189 (2002); David B. Rivkin, Jr., Lee A. Casey, & Darin R. Bartram, The Collapse of the
Soviet Union and the End of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty: A Memorandum of Law Prepared
for the Heritage Foundation, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. 1 (2000); see also Robert Stewart, ABM: No
PENALTY FOR EARLY WITHDRAWAL, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 31, 2001, (Editorial), at A9. But see,
SAMUEL B CRANDALL, TREATIES: THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 423-25 (2d ed. John Byrne &
Company 1916).
20. See Peter Brown, Decision to Scrap ABM Treaty Recognizes Reality, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Dec. 21, 2001, (Editorial), at A21; see also Bill Nichols, Bush Confirms ABM Treaty Withdrawal, USA
TODAY, Dec. 14, 2001, at 7A; Milligan, supra note 15.
21. See Spencer, supra note 5.
22. America Withdraws From ABM Treaty, supra note 14.
23. Susan Milligan, supra note 15.
24. See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 5.
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skyrocketed.25 Others simply maintain that the abrogation will not provide fuel for
an arms race in today's international environment and cite the tame reactions to the
termination of the ABM Treaty from Russia and China as evidence of this
assertion.26
Proponents of the termination also maintain that President Bush and Russian
President Putin have a close relationship-President Bush has often referred to him
as "my friend., 2 7 "The United States and Russia have developed a new, much
more hopeful and constructive relationship," Bush maintains.28 In fact, almost
immediately following Bush's announcement of the termination, President Putin
proposed that the United States and Russia reduce the size of their nuclear
stockpiles to between 1,500 and 2,200 warheads.2 9 Putin has conceded, in spite of
his opposition to the ABM Treaty termination, that it will not affect "the spirit of
partnership and even alliance" between the two nations.30
Proponents also believe that a renewed arms race with China is unlikely.
President Bush phoned China immediately following his announcement of
termination in an attempt to assure the Chinese that they should not interpret the
termination as an offensive move toward China. 3 1 Perhaps because of this gesture,
Ralph A. Cossa, writer for The Orlando Sentinel, insists that conversations
between Cossa and Chinese officials indicate that the Chinese are willing to talk
about improved Sino-U.S. relations.32 In light of recent tensions between the two
nations, this is a positive sign.33
b. Arguments Against Termination
Opponents of the termination counter President Bush's arguments on several
grounds. They contend that the missile defense system for which Bush has
abandoned the ABM Treaty is impractical and that the termination will cause
global instability and a renewed arms race. They further maintain that the
termination has increased the danger of weapons proliferation and that the
withdrawal has damaged the image and reputation of the United States among the
nations of the world. "Winning the peace and achieving stability in the 21st
century," write Robert McNamara and Thomas Graham, Jr., "is all about
international cooperation and strengthening international law, not about U.S.
25. See, Spencer, supra note 5.
26. See William Saire, Editorial, That Dog Won't Bark, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2002, at A27.
27. Milligan, supra note 15; see also Jackson Diehl, Editorial, Dynamic Duo of World Policy,
WASH. POST, Dec. 24, 2001, atAI7.
28. Milligan, supra note 15; see also Diehl, supra note 27.
29. See Milligan, supra note 15. See also Mufson, supra note 9; Stewart, supra note 19.
30. Editorial, Putin on the ABM Treaty, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 20, 2001, at 32.
31. See Ralph A. Cossa, Editorial, A Blessing in Disguise for Sino-U.S. Ties?, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Jan. 14, 2002, at Al 1.
32. See id.
33. In recent months, the Chinese found 27 spying devices hidden in a Boeing 767 that it
purchased from the United States. Even after the United State mistakenly bombed the Chinese
Embassy in Belgrade, the Chinese said little upon finding the bugs. See Safire, supra note 26.
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unilateralism.
34
Individuals opposed to the termination maintain that the proposed missile
defense system will not work. On December 14, 2001, one day after the notice of
intent to withdraw, the Pentagon cancelled one of the U.S. Navy's missile-defense
development programs because of "poor performance."" While this is not the
only NMD program and many are still receiving funding with some measure of
progress, the Hartford Courant claims this is evidence that, "A missile-defense
system as conceived by military planners won't work, can never be foolproof, and
would be prohibitively expensive to deploy.' 36 The Denver Post, after a missile
defense test was delayed due to inclement weather, sarcastically lamented,
"[H]eaven help us if our enemies decide to attack during a rain storm. 37
Even assuming the United States could develop and deploy such a shield,
opponents argue it would not be worth the costs for the limited protection it would
provide. The National Intelligence Council estimates that by 2015, China will
have enough nuclear missiles to overwhelm any such shield; Russia already has
more than enough. 3' However, it is true that "rogue nations" like Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea will likely have long-range delivery systems by 2015,3 9 and Bush
maintains that it is these nations, and not China and Russia, for which the United
State should deploy NMD.
In response to this assertion, Australian diplomat and arms-control advocate
Richard Butler argues that, if confronted with NMD, these nations, as well as
Russia and China, will simply develop a better missile designed to penetrate
America's defense system.40 If nothing else, this would lead to a technological
arms race. Moreover, while there is terrorism, the CIA disagrees with President
Bush's claim that terrorists provide an incentive to develop a missile defense. The
CIA maintains that terrorists "are unlikely to employ long-range missiles,
preferring non-missile delivery systems such as suitcases, trucks or ships. 4 1
Termination supporters are quick to point out that the reactions to the
termination of the ABM Treaty, by Russia and China in particular, have been tame,
but opponents maintain that the ABM situation has increased tensions between the
world powers. There are indications that Bush's announcement has angered the
34. Robert S. McNamara and Thomas Graham, Jr., Op-Ed, Bush ABMStance Endangers America,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 13, 2002, at E 1i.
35. More Trouble for Star Wars, supra note 7.
36. Id.
37. Editorial, ABM Withdrawal Pains, DENVER POST, Dec. 19, 2001, at B6.
38. See Holger Jensen, China Might be Able to Overwhelm U.S. Missile Shield by 2015, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 12, 2002, (Local), at 4A. See also NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL AND
FEDERAL RESEARCH DIVISION, CONFERENCE REPORT: CHINA AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES, available at http://www.odci.gov/nic/pubs/conference
_reports/weapons massdestruction.html (last visited OcL 31, 2002).
39. Jenson, supra note 38. For a brief argument maintaining that a missile defense system does
not address the policy issues governing the U.S. relationship with any of these three countries see
McNamara, supra note 34.
40. See Vernon Loeb, Book World, Armed and Dangerous, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2002, at T5.
41. Jensen, supra note 38.
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Russian Government beyond the reserved response from President Putin. On
Wednesday, January 16, 2002, the lower house of Russia's parliament voted 326-3
for a resolution condemning the United States' withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty. 2 Termination opponents believe that President Bush might cause Putin to
lose face with military commanders who have supported him.43 While President
Bush and President Putin may appear to have a great relationship, the nations they
lead will interact long after their terms in office. A short-term muted response
does not forestall a medium or long-term negative response.
44
Symptoms of a potential rift have surfaced quickly.45 Even as the United
States and Russia discussed decreasing their nuclear stockpiles, Col. Gen. Yuri
Baluyevsky, the head of the Russian delegation, maintained that the American
termination of the ABM Treaty had damaged the atmosphere for the talks. 6 The
Bush Administration fostered this distrust with its decision to put nuclear warheads
into storage rather than destroy them as part of a U.S.-Russian agreement, a
position that angered Russia because it would allow the United States to
"unilaterally and rapidly reconstitute its arsenal of 6,000 strategic warheads." 47
Eventually, the two nations did reach an agreement on an arms reduction treaty
despite the Russian opposition to storage of warheads. 8 It is clear, however, that
the U.S.-Russian relationship is not without tension in light of Russian arms sales
to Iran. 49 Furthermore, Russia plans to form a new $40 billion economic pact with
Iraq even as the U.S. contemplates war against Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.50
Russia is not the only nation that seems uncomfortable. 5' China is concerned
about the possibility that an American missile shield will render its current arsenal
useless.52 On December 26, 2001, China announced that it would increase its
42. See Paul Richter, Foreign Desk, Russia, US. Arms Talks End on Chill Military, L.A. TIMES,
Jan. 17, 2002, at A5.
43. See ABM Withdrawal Pains, supra note 37.
44. See McNamara, supra note 34; see also Mufson, supra note 9.
45. See McNamara, supra note 34.
46. See Richter, supra note 42.
47. McNamara, supra note 34; Robert Cottrell and Judy Dempsey, The Americas, US Plan to
Store Nuclear Weapons Vexes Russia, FINANCIAL TIMES (LONDON), Jan. I1, 2002, at 6; see also
Richter, supra note 42, Jensen, supra note 37.
48. See, e.g., James Gerstenzang, Bush and Putin Sign Nuclear Arms Treaty, L.A. TIMES, May 25,
2002 (Foreign Desk), at Al.
49. See, e.g., id.
50. See Peter Baker, Russia, Iraq Plan Economic Deal to Bolster Ties; Moscow's Aid Sought on
Energy, Infrastructure; Pact May Complicate U.S. Action Against Baghdad, WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
2002, at A09. Russia has also joined France in announcing it would veto any United Nations resolution
proposed by the United States that would authorize a war with Iraq. Elizabeth Neuffer and John
Donnelly, Confronting Iraq: US Support Lags; Vote Put Off Vetoes Vowed; Compromise on Iraq Eyed,
THE BOSTON GLOBE, March 11, 2003 at Al.
51. For further commentary on Russia's negative perceptions of U.S. intentions, see Howard Witt,
News, U.S. Throws Wrench into Russia Ties; ABM Disarmament Moves Irk Kremlin, CHI. TRiB., Jan.
17, 2002, at 3N.
52. See Vivien Pik-Kwan Chan, Mainland to Increase Budget for the Military, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Dec. 27, 2001, at 1; see also McNamara, supra note 34.
VOL. 31i:2
CONGRESS AND THE TREATY POWER
military spending this year."s While this alone may not be news, Beijing sources
indicated that China, "would like the news to serve as a warning to the United
States over its recent decision to abandon the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
5 4
Even Europe has shown anger toward the U.S. In what may have been an attempt
to maintain his relationship with Putin, Bush proposed to include Russia in
decision-making procedures of NATO.55 After criticism from Europe and
Washington, Bush and Putin shelved the proposal. 6
Ill. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. The ABM Treaty
1. The Nature of the Treaty
In Goldwater v. Carter, the majority in the D.C. Circuit, and Justice Brennan
at the Supreme Court level, maintained that the type of treaty involved could bear
on how the United States should terminate." However, the situation involving the
ABM Treaty does not contain the features of mutual defense or executive ability to
recognize foreign nations that were present in the Goldwater case. Termination of
the ABM Treaty does not change U.S. commitments to defending its allies, nor
does it invoke any specific executive powers already recognized by the Supreme
Court other than the president's authority in foreign affairs.58 Since the issue is
tangential to the issue of the ABM Treaty, this paper will note it, but, for the sake
of brevity, will not analyze it any further.
2. The Termination Clause
The termination clause of the ABM Treaty 9 provides that each party shall
have the right to terminate the Treaty on six months notice if "extraordinary events
related to the subject matter of [the] Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests."
For the purposes of this paper alone, the author concedes that the relatively new
53. See Chan, supra note 52.
54. Id. This agitation seems particularly undesirable in light of ongoing tension between the
United States and China due to U.S. strategic alliances in the region. See, e.g., Michael A. Lev,
Taiwan's Contradictory Behavior Toward China Raises Confusion, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr. 14,
2002, at A2 1; Craig Skehan, Howard Told To Confront Japanese PM On Whaling, SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD, May 1, 2002, at 4.
55. See Diehl, supra note 27.
56. See id.
57. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707 (1979), vacated by 444 U.S. 996 (1979). This is
particularly apparent in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, where he maintained that President Carter
could terminate the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan on the narrow grounds that, as a mutual
defense treaty, it was inexorably connected with his derecognition of Taiwan and recognition of
mainland China. See infra p. 252.
58. See infra p. 252.
59. See supra p. 227.
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threat of rogue states developing ballistic missiles and the September 11, 2001
attacks were "extraordinary events related to the subject matter" of the Treaty, and
that they have jeopardized the "supreme interests" of the United States.60 Thus, the
prominent legal question for the purposes of this clause is whether a party has
properly terminated the ABM Treaty.
3. Does the ABM Language Support President Bush's Termination?
Proponents of terminating the ABM Treaty, naturally, maintain that it does.6 1
However, the language of the ABM Treaty dictates that a "Party" shall have the
power to terminate the Treaty.62 The Treaty Preamble defines the Parties as the
nations involved in the Treaty, not their executives; 63 thus, the United States is the
party to the Treaty, not George W. Bush or the office of the presidency. No
provision of the ABM Treaty provides for the executive having sole power to
terminate the Treaty.64
Since the ABM Treaty does not provide an answer to the question of what
branch of the United States government has the power to terminate, it is necessary
to turn to the Constitution to make this determination. After all, if the Senate
already had the constitutional authority to play a role in the termination of the
ABM Treaty during the ratification process, it would not need to reserve that right
when it gave its advice and consent. It follows that President Bush can terminate
the ABM Treaty only if he has the power to terminate treaties on behalf of the
United States under the U.S. Constitution.65
B. The Constitution of the United States: Relevant Provisions
The Constitution is silent on how the United States should terminate a treaty.
While it confers upon the President the power, "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur," it does not elaborate any further on the treaty power.66 However,
the Constitution does proclaim that, ". . .all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
60. Bush's statement upon announcing the termination of the ABM Treaty lists these as the
predominant factors in the decision. See America Withdrawsfrom ABM Treaty, supra note 14 ("I have
concluded the ABM Treaty hinders our government's ability to develop ways to protect our people
from future terrorist or rogue-state missile attacks.").
61. See, e.g., Mufson, supra note 9. The Court of Appeals in the Goldwater case maintained that
a termination clause was important to its decision that President Carter could terminate the Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan unilaterally because the Senate, when giving its advice and consent, did
not state that it wanted to maintain a say in termination of the treaty. Goldwater, 617 at 708, vacated by
444 U.S. 996 (1979). Therefore, there is some precedent for this position. However, the decision of the
Court of Appeals, having been vacated, it is not binding on any court. For further discussion of this
case, see infra text accompanying notes 125-155.
62. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at art. XV, §2, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
63. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2, at Preamble, 23 U.S.T. 3435.
64. See id.
65. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 699.
66. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2.
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under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and
the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby," thus associating treaties with the
Constitution and the laws of the United States. 67 While these are the only clauses
that specifically address treaties, the lack of a specific procedure for treaty
termination also makes the Necessary and Proper Clause of interest in resolving
this issue. The Constitution dictates that the U.S. Congress has the power, "To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States or in any Department or Officer thereof."
6
1
C. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
1. The Restatement's Position
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 339
(1987) (hereinafter "Restatement") maintains that the President of the United
States has the power, amongst other things, "[T]o suspend or terminate an
agreement in accordance with its terms. 69 In reaching this conclusion, the drafters
of the Restatement relied largely on United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp.70. 7 1 The following section examines this case in relation to treaty
termination.
2. Does the Restatement Support President Bush's Termination?
Restatements are not binding legal documents; they are attempts to
summarize the state of the law in the view of the majority of its authors. Thus, the
support the Restatement lends to President Bush's unilateral termination of the
ABM Treaty depends upon the strength of its argument and the sources from
which it draws its conclusion.
Curtiss-Wright involved a conspiracy on the part of the appellants to sell arms
to Bolivia during that nation's conflict in the Chaco.72 The United States asserted
that this violated both a Joint Resolution passed by Congress, which authorized
President Roosevelt to criminalize arms sales that would affect foreign conflicts,
and the subsequent proclamation issued by Roosevelt.73 The appellees challenged
the indictment, in relevant part, on the grounds that the Joint Resolution violated
67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
68. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 339 cmt. a
(1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
70. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
71. RESTATEMENT § 339 at cmt. a. The Comment cites only Curtiss-Wright. While the Reporter's
Notes cite a couple of other cases, these cases (other than Goldwater) are tangential to the main issue
and are cited to support points not questioned in this paper.
72. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 311.
73. See id. at 311.
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the Nondelegation Doctrine.74
The Court, in an opinion by Justice Sutherland, found that Congress had not
violated the Nondelegation Doctrine. 75 The Court, without deciding whether such
an order concerning domestic affairs would violate Nondelegation, held that there
was no delegation issue because of the president's traditional powers in foreign
affairs and the tradition of Congress passing such authorizing legislation in relation
to foreign affairs. Justice Sutherland wrote,
It is important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority
vested in the President by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an
authority plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as
the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations - a
power which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress, but
which, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution.
76
The Restatement's use of Curtiss-Wright as the only support for the position
that the President can terminate a treaty unilaterally is weak. The actual issue had
nothing to do with the power to make or terminate treaties.77 While the Court used
broad-sounding dicta in discussing the power of the executive in foreign relations,
the real question was one of Congressional authority to delegate such power to the
President.78 If the Court hinted that the President would not have needed the Act
of Congress to take action, it did not directly say or hold SO. 7 9 Even if it had,
terminating a binding legal treaty between nations is different from criminalizing
an arms sale. In fact, Justice Sutherland only mentioned the treaty power as one
example of the President's responsibilities in the area of foreign affairs.80 Nothing
in the opinion that would support unilateral presidential termination of treaties is
binding legal precedent.81
74. See id. at 315. The Nondelegation Doctrine is the legal conception that Congress may not
make excessive delegations of its power to make laws to another branch of Government. See, e.g.,
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) ("Art. 1, § I of the U.S. Constitution
vests all legislative power in the Congress. Thus, when Congress confers decision-making authority it
must lay down an "intelligible principle.").
75. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 329.
76. Id. at 319-20.
77. See id. at 315. Furthermore, Justice Southerland's argument for nearly unilateral presidential
discretion in foreign affairs in general is questionable. Many scholars have offered strong critiques of
the Curtiss-Wright reasoning. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional
Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. REv. 1, 102 (1999); Anthony Simones, The Reality of Curtiss-
Wright, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 411, 416 (1996); Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign
Affairs Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 5, 11-16 (1988).
78. See id. at315.
79. See id.
80. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S at 319.
81. While many sources cite the Curtiss-Wright dicta for the proposition of expansive executive
authority in foreign relations, there are historical considerations that weigh against interpreting this case
too broadly. Curtiss-Wright was decided in 1936. At that time, Franklin D. Roosevelt received an
electoral mandate for his New Deal. The Supreme Court, since the 1930's had struggled with the
delegation powers to the Executive Branch essential to carrying out the New Deal. It is logical to
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D. Historical Precedents
In a case such as this, where the Constitutional language is unclear, the
methods of treaty termination the United States has used in the past may be
important in determining how the Court will rule. Unfortunately, the United States
has not developed a uniform method of treaty termination since its formation.
There have been many different methods used to terminate treaties. However, the
vast majority of these instances show that Congress has played an important role in
treaty termination.
1. The First U.S. Treaty Termination
Congress carried out the first treaty termination accomplished by the United
82States through an Act passed on July, 7 1798. In Hooper v. United States, the
court of claims validated the act. The case evolved from Congress' termination of
the first series of treaties with France. A French frigate sunk a registered schooner
from the United States. 83 Hooper, the administrator of an estate of one of the co-
owners of the schooner, claimed that the French Treaties of 1778 remained in force
and could be used as the basis of a spoliation claim against the U.S. Government
for the loss of the ship. a The Government maintained, however, that Congress
had terminated the treaties by its Act of July 7, 1798.5
In rendering its decision, the court of claims held Congress was the correct
U.S. authority to abrogate a treaty and had properly issued the terminating act,
apparently on the grounds that a treaty was the supreme law of the land and thus, a
legislative Act was needed for its termination.8 6 "The treaties therefore ceased to
be a supreme law of the land," the court maintained, "... The annulling act issued
from competent authority and was the official act of the government of the United
States. So far as it was within the power of one party to abrogate these treaties it
was undisputedly done by the Act of July 7, 1787. ' '87
While the facts of this case and that of the ABM Treaty are not identical, the
case is particularly relevant because both the termination and the case took place
soon after the Federal Convention of 1787.88 Courts have always viewed actions
taken in close proximity to the framing of the Constitution "as a contemporaneous
conclude that the Curtiss-Wright decision, being at heart a Nondelegation Doctrine decision, resulted in
part from this environment and a hope of the Court to appease, not only President Roosevelt, but also a
public that needed programs it had recently invalidated on Nondelegation grounds. See Robert J.
Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
393, 457 (1996); see also A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
82. Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887).
83. Id. at 409- 10.
84. Id. at 409-1I.
85. Id. at 411.
86. Id. at 418.
87. Hooper, 22 Ct. Cl. at 418.
88. Id.
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exposition of the highest authority."8 9 In Hooper, the Court of Claims clearly
stated that an Act of Congress, signed by the president, was the proper manner in
which the U.S. could terminate a treaty. 90
2. Subsequent Precedents
In 1979, Senator Barry Goldwater's attorney maintained that, "of 55 treaties
terminated by the United States, 52 were broken with congressional approval." 91
President Jimmy Carter, in contrast, pointed to thirteen instances where the
president, purportedly, had acted to terminate a treaty without Congress in an
attempt to justify his unilateral termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan. Upon closer examination of these cases, it is evident that they do not
provide precedent for unilateral presidential termination of a treaty.92
In nine of these instances the other party or parties to the treaty either no
longer existed, chose to terminate the treaty, violated the treaty, or the president at
the time merely took notice of these conditions.93 In one, Congress never
questioned the legality of the termination because the president had the approval of
several prominent Congressmen before the termination of a minor treaty with
Mexico, with whom U.S. relations in general had greatly deteriorated. In one other
case Carter pointed to, no termination ever actually took place. Finally, in two of
the occasions alluded to by Carter, Congress had already passed a law superceding
the treaty or implicitly authorizing its termination. 94  An example of such
Congressional authorization, as well as examples of explicit Presidential
acknowledgement of Congress' authority to terminate treaties, will provide a
foundation for the conclusion that historical precedent supports Congress'
authority in this field.
Carter claimed that President McKinley terminated the 1850 Convention of
Friendship, Commerce, and Extradition with Switzerland after negotiating a
89. See, e.g., Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 719 citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 300-01
(1930); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 (1960).
90. See Hooper, 22 Ct. Cl. at 416.
91. Lawrence Meyer, Suit on Taiwan a Political Issue, Bell Tells Court; Bell Says Taiwan Treaty
a Political Issue, WASH. POST, May 9, 1979, at Al. See also Walter C. Clemens, Jr., nho Terminates a
Treaty, BULL. ATOM. SCI., Nov./Dec., 2001, Vol. 57, No. 6. For more on Goldwater, see infra text
accompanying notes 125-155. For examples of treaties terminated by Acts of Joint Resolutions of
Congress, see, e.g., 37 Stat. 627 (1911) (Joint Resolution Providing for the termination of the treaty of
1832 between the United States and Russia); 22 Stat. 641 (1883) (Joint Resolution providing for the
termination of certain articles of the treaty between the United States of America and Her Britannic
Majesty); 13 Stat. 568 (1865) (Joint Resolution to terminate the Treaty of 1817, regulating the naval
Force on the Lakes).
92. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 727, citing Jonathan York Thomas, The Abuse of History: A Refutation
of the State Department Analysis of Alleged Instances of Independent Presidential Treaty Termination,
6 YALE J. STUD. WORLD PUB. ORD. 27, 79 (1979). See these sources for a full account of each
supposed termination.
93. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 727-32.
94. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 728-32.
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reciprocity agreement with France in the late Nineteenth Century.95 However, in
the Tariff Act of July 24, 1897, Congress authorized the President to negotiate
such agreements.96 This Act conflicted with the 1850 Treaty and, since Congress
passed it after the ratification of the Treaty, it superceded the Treaty as the law of
the land.97 Thus, this was not a case of unilateral presidential treaty termination,
the President simply acknowledged the fact that the legislation superceded the
Treaty.
In fact, the executive branch has acknowledged Congress' power to terminate
treaties on multiple occasions. For example, President Polk recognized Congress'
authority in this area in relation to the Oregon Territory Treaty in 1846.98 After
President Polk had specifically asked Congress for its permission for him to
terminate the Treaty, Congress responded with a joint resolution authorizing Polk
to give notice to Great Britain.99 Thirty years later, President Grant, in the context
of the British Treaty of 1842, stated, "it is for the wisdom of Congress to determine
whether the article of the treaty ... relating to extradition is to be any longer
regarded as obligatory on the Government of the United States or as forming part
of the supreme law of the land."' l Grant went further, maintaining that, even if
Great Britain continued to act in counter to the spirit of the Treaty, he would not
extradite any person "without an expression of the wish of Congress."''1
In recent years, the United States has terminated few treaties. In 1985,
President Reagan announced he was terminating the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce, and Navigation Between the United States and Nicaragua.
m0 2
However, he did so under the emergency provisions of the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act of 1977, and, thus, with authorization from
Congress. m°3 Looking back from today to the first treaty terminated by the United
States, historical precedent establishes a congressional role in treaty termination.
95. Id. at 727
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 724.
99. See 9 Stat. 109-10 (1846) (Joint resolution concerning the Oregon Territory).
100. Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 726 citing 9 J. RICHARDSON, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 4324, 4327 (1897). President Grant, during a June 20, 1876 message to Congress, asked if
he should regard the treaty's article on extradition as void on "account of certain acts of the British
government."
101. Id. at 726.
102. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Reagan's Power Wide Under Emergency Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 2,
1985, at A10.
103. International Emergency Economic Powers Act, §202, 91 Stat. 1626 codified at 50 U.S.C.
1701 (1977). Congress specifically limited the Act to national emergencies in order to narrow the scope
of the authority it granted to the president. "The authorities granted to the President... may only be
exercised to deal with an unusual and extraordinary threat with respect to which a national emergency
has been declared for purposes of this title and may not be exercised for any other purpose. Any
exercise of such authorities to deal with any new threat shall be based on a new declaration of national
emergency which must be with respect to such threat."
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E. Other Supreme Court Precedents
Goldwater v. Carter is the primary Supreme Court precedent on this issue and
will be discussed in the next section. However, only Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion reached the merits. Judges in the lower courts considered other Supreme
Court cases relevant to the Goldwater case. It is important to consider these as
legal precedents in considering the ABM Treaty case.
1. Neely v. Henkel' 4
There is Supreme Court precedent that supports reading of the Necessary and
Proper Clause to give Congress the treaty termination power.' 0 5 In Neely v.
Henkel, Charles F.W. Neely was charged with embezzling funds in Cuba while the
United States occupied the country after the Spanish-American War.10 6 Neely
filed a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the June 6, 1900 Act under which he
was charged was unconstitutional on several grounds.1
0 7
One of the major questions before the Court in determining if the Act was
constitutional was whether the sections that gave effect to the provisions of the
Treaty of Paris between the United States and the Kingdom of Spain were valid.'
0 8
In concluding that the June 6, 1900 Act was valid, Justice Harlan wrote
The power of Congress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into
execution as well the powers enumerated in section 8 of article I of the
Constitution, as all others vested in the Government of the United States, or in any
Department or the officers thereof, includes the power to enact such legislation as
is appropriate to give efficacy to any stipulations which it is competent for the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to insert in a treaty
with a foreign power.109
Justice Harlan used the Necessary and Proper Clause in reaching the decision
in this case. The issue here is one of implementation, and not of treaty termination
as in Hooper. However, since Bush's claim of authority comes, at least in part,
from the termination clause in the ABM Treaty, the two cases read together form a
strong argument for Congressional authority in the termination of the ABM
Treaty. 110
In Neely, the Supreme Court acknowledged Congress' power to enforce
clauses within ratified treaties.' In the ABM Treaty case, Bush claims he has the
104. Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
105. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 718; see also Van Der Weyde v. Ocean Transport Co., 297 U.S.
114, 116-18 (1936) (holding valid an Act of Congress that "requested and directed" the President to
terminate treaty provisions inconsistent with the Seaman's Act of Mar. 4, 1915).
106. See Neely, 180 U.S. at 112-13.
107. Id. at 114.
108. Id. at 121.
109. Neely, 180 U.S at 121.
110. Accord Hooper, 22 Ct. Cl. at 418 with Neely, 180 U.S. at 121.
111. SeeNeely, 180 U.S. at 122.
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authority as president to affect the termination clause found in Article XV. This
claim of authority contradicts the outcome in Neely, since the Court, through
Justice Harlan, approved the Congress' claim of authority in executing treaty
provisions. Unless both the executive and legislative branches, independently,
have the power to enforce treaty provisions, a court reaching the merits would have
to overturn or distinguish Neely, as well as Hooper, in order to maintain that Bush
has the power to act under Article XV of the ABM Treaty.
2. Myers v. United States
' 2
In Myers, the Court decided a case involving the appointments clause of
Article II, which reads in a similar manner as the Treaty clause and maintains that
the president
... by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,... shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may be Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The president removed Myers as a postmaster through an order from the
postmaster general." 4 Myers sued, maintaining that the President did not have the
power to remove him." 5 The Court, through Chief Justice Taft, held that, "In the
absence of any specific provision to the contrary, the power of appointment to
executive office carries with it, as a necessary incident, the power of removal." 6
Myers stands for the proposition that, unless a power granted to the executive
by the Constitution is specifically circumscribed, it belongs to that branch alone." 
7
Chief Justice Taft, in Myers, maintained that, "The fact that the executive power is
given in general terms strengthened by specific terms where emphasis is
appropriate, and limited by direct expressions where limitation is needed and that
no express limit is placed on the power of removal by the executive, is a
convincing indication that none was intended."" 8 If one reads the treaty clause in
light of Myers, it would appear that the only power the Congress has related to
treaties is the Senate's advice and consent power in creating them, since the
wording of the two powers is nearly identical.
The issue of treaty termination is different in nature from that of executive
112. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
113. U.S. Const. art. 11, § 2.
114. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 106.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 126.
117. It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has narrowed this opinion somewhat through
its disposition in the case of Humphrey's Executor, Rathburn v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32
(1935).
118. Myers, 272 U.S. at 128.
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appointments.' 19 The executive can argue that it needs the power to remove its
own officials in order to manage its own internal bureaucracy. 2  This control
makes the president better able to carry out his duty to execute the laws of the
United States. In contrast, the power to terminate treaties affects, not only the
United States, but also the other nation(s) involved in the treaty.' 2' Furthermore,
the Congress has historical claims to a role in treaty termination.1
22
There is also a very concrete, textual difference between terminating a treaty
and dismissing an executive official. An executive official may help the president
execute a law and, thus, is important to the executive branch in executing the law
as it reads it. In contrast, a ratified treaty is part of the supreme law of the land. It
is one thing to change individuals that enforce the law, but another to change the
law itself.123 Changing the law itself looks more like a legislative duty for the
Congress.
Congress' function is to make laws, while the executive branch has the job of
enforcing them. Giving the president power over confirmed executive officials
furthers the president's capacity to perform the executive function of law
enforcement. In contrast, giving the president total control over treaty termination
extends the executive's power past this primary function. For this reason,
unilateral presidential treaty termination requires closer scrutiny than the Court
gave dismissal of executive appointees in Myers. Nevertheless, the judges in
Goldwater clashed about the relevancy and scope of the Myers decision in respect
to the treaty termination issue.
F. Goldwater v. Carter
1. The Case
The Supreme Court has faced the treaty termination power only once, in
Goldwater v. Carter.124 The Court issued no majority opinion and declined to
reach the merits. 25 However, the district and circuit courts did issue opinions on
the merits. 126 While the Supreme Court decision is paramount in considering the
issue of the ABM Treaty termination, a brief description of all of the opinions is
useful for bringing out the textual and policy arguments as background for this
119. See David J. Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States De-
Recognition of the Republic of China, 19 HARV. INT'L L. J. 931, 990 (1978); but see Randall H. Nelson,
The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42
MINN. L. REv. 879, 887 (1958).
120. See Scheffer, supra note 120, at 990.
121. Id. at 990.
122. See supra pp. 241-55.
123. See Nelson, supra note 119, at 888.
124. Goldwater, 444 U.S 996 (1979).
125. Id.
126. See Goldwater v. Carter, 481 F. Supp. 949 (1979), reversed by Goldwater, 617 F.2d 697
(1979).
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paper's analysis of the intent of the Framers. 127
The District Court for the District of Columbia, in an opinion authored by
Judge Gasch, held that President Carter's notice of treaty termination needed to
receive approval from two-thirds of the Senate or a majority of both houses of
Congress in order to be effective under the Constitution of the United States. 128
Gasch ruled that the senators challenging Carter's termination of the Mutual
Defense Treaty with Taiwan had standing. 29 He also held that deciding the case
on the merits would not violate the Political Question Doctrine. 30  After
addressing these preliminary issues, Gasch ruled that, under Article VI, clause 2 of
the Constitution, treaties are part of the supreme law of the land that the president
is responsible to execute. 13  In order to repeal the supreme law of the land, the
president needs Congress. 32judge Gasch believed that the historical precedents, at
the least, supported some form of cooperative action.133 He also refused to apply
the Myers rational to treaty termination.134 As a matter of policy, the court was
concerned about providing the president with such a broad, unchecked power as
treaty termination.135 While the court decided that either two-thirds of the Senate
or a majority vote of both houses of Congress could legally approve the action,
Judge Gasch discussed only briefly, and somewhat unclearly, why he reached that
exact determination. 136
A divided DC Circuit Court reversed. Five of the judges wrote the per
curiam opinion of the court. 13 7 The majority agreed with Judge Gasch that the
appellees had standing,138 but reversed on the merits. 39 While they gave several
reasons for this decision, all of these, in some part, revolved around the President's
127. The facts of Goldwater are not very different from those at issue here. The two most relevant
differences are that the Mutual Defense Treaty at issue in Goldwater did not contain a supreme interests
clause within it termination provision and that President Carter terminated the Mutual Defense Treaty
incident to derecognizing Taiwan, the other party to the Treaty, and recognizing China. Justice
Brennan would have rendered an opinion on this narrow basis. For more details concerning the facts of
Goldwater, see, e.g., Daniel Horwitch, The Unresolved Question of Unilateral Treaty Terminations:
Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S.Ct. 533 (1979), 4 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L. L. REv. (1980).
128. See Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 965.
129. Id. at 955-56. The basic requirements for standing are "(1) that he has suffered injury in fact;
(2) that the interests being asserted are within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question; (3) that the injury is caused by the challenged action; and (4) that
the injury is capable of being redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 951.
130. Id. at 956-58.
131. Id. at 962.
132. Id.
133. Id. at960.
134. Id. at 960-61.
135. Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 963, citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton).
136. Id. at 965.
137. Two of the justices, Chief Judge Wright and Judge Tamm, concurred in the result but never
reached the merits because they believed that appellees lacked standing. See Goldwater v. Carter, 617
F.2d at 699-709 (1979). For the sake of brevity, discussion of this opinion is omitted.
138. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 708. The majority did not believe the Political Question Doctrine
applied because the issue before them, as they interpreted it, was extremely narrow.
139. Id. at 699.
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power in foreign affairs. The majority specifically noted its disagreement with
Judge Gasch on the Article VI issue, maintaining that by labeling treaties the
"supreme law of the land," the Framers were merely telling state judges that they
took precedence over state law. 140 The majority also noted that this was a narrow
decision, in light of the nature of the treaty and the fact that the Senate had ratified
it with a termination clause and had not placed any special conditions on a possible
future termination. 
41
Judge MacKinnon wrote a lengthy and vigorous dissent in which he would
have affirmed the District Court to the extent that its decision required a majority
of both houses of Congress to effect the termination of a treaty.14 2 MacKinnon
relied on Article VI, providing that treaties are the supreme law of the land, read in
conjunction with the Necessary and Proper Clause in reaching his decision.
MacKinnon saw treaty termination as "an implied power vested in the
government." Since the Constitution did not expressly grant the Government the
power to terminate treaties, it had to be implied under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. 1
43
The Supreme Court vacated the decision of the DC Circuit and ordered the
case to be dismissed. Six justices agreed that the Court should vacate the decisions
below without reaching the merits, but only four agreed on the reasoning for the
move. Of the three justices who disagreed with the outcome, two would have set
the case for oral argument, and one would have affirmed the decision of the DC
Circuit on very narrow grounds. '
Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and three other justices, invoked
the Political Question Doctrine. 145 Rehnquist concluded that, since there is no
constitutionally proscribed procedure for treaty termination and different types of
termination procedures might be appropriate for different types of treaties, the
issue should be decided by "political standards" rather than judicial ones.
14 6
Justice Powell provided the fifth and decisive vote to vacate the judgment below.
However, Justice Powell wrote that the issue was a matter of standing.147 Justice
Powell expressly disagreed with the idea that the issue presented a Political
Question that the Court could never address.' 48  Justice Brennan would have
affirmed the Court of Appeals on the very narrow grounds that the termination of
the treaty at issue was incidental to the power to recognize a nation, which belongs
to the executive branch. 49 The remaining justices would have scheduled the case
140. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 704.
141. Id. at 708.
142. Id. at 716-40.
143. Id. at 717 citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 18.
144. While Justice Marshall concurred in the result, he did not write an opinion expressing his
reasons, nor did he join the opinion of Justice Powell or that of Justice Rehnquist. See Goldwater, 444
U.S. at 996.
145. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 998.
146. Id. at 1003 citing Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (N.D. III. 1975) (three-judge court).
147. Id. at 996.
148. Id. at999.
149. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1006. It is interesting to note that Justice Brennan wrote the
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for oral argument.'so
2. Does The Court's Opinion Support Bush's Position?
Commentators often cite Goldwater as supporting the ability of the president
to terminate a treaty without Congress,' 5 ' but there was only one opinion on the
merits given on very narrow grounds and no opinion commanded a majority. The
Political Question Doctrine has fallen out of favor with the Supreme Court since it
decided Goldwater v. Carter.'5 2 Thus, then-Justice Rehnquist's position is on even
more questionable ground than it was in 1979, when it could not command a
majority of the Court.
Aside from the Political Question Doctrine, Justice Powell's opinion on
standing received no other support from the Court, and that of only two judges at
the appellate level.'13 Justice Brennan's opinion also stood alone. 54 The Goldwater
case provides clues to both sides to a potential litigation on what issues to argue
and how to argue them, as well as what Constitutional arguments may be
convincing. However, the case does not appear to provide any specific or binding,
legal support to either branch of the Federal Government on this issue, despite
Carter's ultimate success in terminating the Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty.
IV. AN ORIGINALIST ARGUMENT AGAINST UNILATERAL PRESIDENTIAL
TERMINATION
The arguments concerning treaty termination traditionally center around
policy. One can interpret the textual provisions like the majority of the Court of
Appeals in Goldwater, and say that the treaty power is an executive function under
the president's authority in foreign affairs. 5 5 In the alternative, one can interpret
the Necessary and Proper Clause, in conjunction with Article VI, section 2, to say
that the Congress must play a role in terminating treaties. 5 6 In either case, an
evaluation of the typical constitutional policies of checks and balances and
separation of powers drives the interpretation. Because of the need for this
interpretation, it is useful to attempt to understand how the Framers of the
Constitution balanced these considerations.
Supreme Courts opinion in Bakery. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the case in which the Court laid out the
modem-day criteria of the Political Question Doctrine. Brennan did not believe this case fell under the
test he annunciated in Baker.
150. Id. at 1006.
151. See, e.g., Carlos Manuel Vasquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92
COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1132 (1992); Ronald A. Lehmann, Reinterpreting Advice and Consent: A
Congressional Fast Track for Arms Control Treaties, 98 YALE L. J. 885, 890 n.24 (1989).
152. See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 237 (2002).
153. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 709.
154. See Goldwater, 444 U. S. at 1006.
155. See Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 704.
156. See id, at 717 (MacKinnon, J. dissenting).
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A. The Difficulty in Determining the Intent of the Framers
As Judge Gasch said in his opinion in Goldwater, the intent of the Framers
concerning the termination of treaties is unclear.'57 However, at least one author
has formulated an argument that the Framers intended the Executive Branch to
predominate in the realm of treaties based on Originalist evidence. 158  The
remainder of this paper will present the opposite thesis. It will illustrate that the
Framers' desire for treaties to be part of the supreme law of the land, their fear of
the possibility that one faction or party might impose its views and positions on the
whole nation, and their desire for the treaty power to be executed in such a way as
to maintain the "national character" support a constitutional desire for a
Congressional check on the termination of international treaties.
Yet, in formulating an argument from Originalist sources, one must be careful
about what one takes as evidence of the intent of the Framers. The political
positions of the Founders motivated their post-ratification statements and positions.
Perhaps the best example is Thomas Jefferson, whom Judge MacKinnon cited as a
source of originalist evidence in his dissent in Goldwater. However, Jefferson's
position changed from 1793, when he was the Secretary of State in the Executive
Branch, to when he wrote A Manual of Parliamentary Practice for the Use of the
Senate of the United States as President of the Senate during the presidency of
John Adams.' 59 In 1793, six years after the framing of the Constitution, Secretary
of State Jefferson told M. Genet that the Constitution, "had made the President the
last appeal" concerning the termination of treaties, since the legislature was
supreme in "making the laws only."' 16 In contrast, in 1812, when Jefferson had a
vested interest in the powers of the legislative branch, Jefferson's manual reads,
"Treaties being declared... to be the supreme law of the land, it is understood that
an act of the legislature alone can declare them to be infringed and rescinded."'161
Statements by Madison and Hamilton present similar issues of credibility
when one tries to determine what the individual really thought at the time of the
framing before their political stations influenced their judgment. Both changed
positions on several issues, including the meaning of the text of the Constitution
and methods of constitutional interpretation during the debates over the Jay Treaty
in the first Congress. Both were attempting to gain political advantage for their
157. See Goldwater, 481 F. Supp. at 958.
158. See Frances Fitzgerald, Politics as Law? The Antiballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of
Powers, and Treaty Interpretation: Way Out There in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the
Cold War, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 851, 899-901 (2001). For discussion of Fitzgerald's argument, see supra
p. 257-59.
159. See JOHN NORTON MOORE, FREDRICK S. TIPSON & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL SECURITY
LAw 798-99 (Carolina Academic Press 1990). Moore actually refers to the second edition of the
Manual, which was released in 1812. However, Jefferson was Adam's Vice President, and thus the
President of the Senate in 1801.
160. See MOORE, supra note 159, at 798 for a full excerpt of Jefferson's recollection of the
conversation.
161. Id. at 799.
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newly formed parties in the forthcoming election. 62 Madison, for example, argued
that the treaty-making provision of Article II was in conflict with Article 1. He
maintained that the President and the Senate, if not subject to House consent, could
use treaties to usurp the proper powers of the House to do things such as make the
US a party to a foreign war, furnish troops for overseas use, and keep a standing
army for mutual security projects. He argued for a construction of the Constitution
in light of the overall theme of Separation of Powers and, thus, the House should
have some power regarding the making of treaties.
63
This position, however, contradicted an argument Madison had made in 1793
under the pseudonym Helvidius.'64 In the Helvidius writings, he had maintained
that the President could not unilaterally pull out of a treaty, but that the consent of
the Senate served as a proxy for that of the House.165 Thus, while denying the
House any role in his earlier writing, he argued for giving the House a say in the
treaty power when he served in that body. This tension between these two
positions caused Madison to lose a great deal of respect from his fellow
representatives. 166
In the end, Judge Gasch was right. There is no defimitive originalist evidence
that directly states how the United States should terminate treaties. Despite these
difficulties, a wealth of indirect evidence indicates that unilateral presidential
termination flies in the face of what the Framers would have wanted. While
evidence from other sources is not rendered completely useless by post-ratification
politics, this paper focuses on The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 and
The Federalist, sources not as tainted by post-ratification politics, in analyzing the
intent of the Framers on this issue.
B. The Chronology of the Treaty Power in the Framing
The Federal Convention of 1787 opened on May 14, 1787.167 There was no
treaty power mentioned in the Virginia Plan, the first outline of a Constitution
proposed at the convention. 16  A Constitutional provision on treaties did not
appear in the work of the convention until the Committee on Detail conducted its
work, which started on June 19, 1787.169 According to Madison's papers, the final
draft of the Committee of Detail that the Convention received on August 6, 1787,
stated that, "The Senate of the United States shall have the power to make treaties,
and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court."'' 70 The product
162. See JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER
ORIGINAL INTENT 146 (1999).
163. Id. at 149.
164. Id. at 150.
165. Id.
166. See Lynch, supra note 162, at 157.
167. See MAx FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, [hereinafter
RECORDS], Vol. 1, 1 (1966).
168. Id. at 20.
169. See RECORDS, Vol. II, 129, 132 (1966).
170. Id. at 183.
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gave no power concerning treaties to the Executive Branch.' 7' This was very
different from Alexander Hamilton's plan to put the treaty making power in the
President, with the Senate playing the role of advice and consent, which he had
proposed to the Convention.
172
The first mention of any form of Treaty power in the executive branch in any
proposal did not come until August 20, 1787. On that day, the Committee of the
Whole recommended to the Committee of Five that there be, "The Secretary of
Foreign Affairs who shall also be appointed by the President during pleasure- It
shall be his duty to correspond with all foreign ministers, prepare plans of Treaties,
and consider such as may be transmitted from abroad."'' 73 This proposal, however,
did not change the powers of the Senate. It is obvious that the Convention had
difficulty with the powers of the Senate in general, as it often tabled such
provisions until later in the Convention while it went through the other provisions
of the work of the Committee on Detail mostly in order.
174
The Convention seemed to determine it did not like the treaty clause as it
stood, giving sole power to the Senate, but did not know how to alter it. At the end
of August 23, it referred it to the Committee of Five. 175 On Tuesday, September 4,
1787, the Committee of Eleven reported to the House. This report included the
language, "The President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall
have the power to make treaties... But no Treaty except Treaties of Peace shall be
made without the consent of two thirds of the members present.' 76 While the
convention made other changes, the important alteration became permanent, and
the treaty power moved to the executive branch, "by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate."'
177
C. Arguments for Strong Presidential Authority in Treaties
Frances Fitzgerald argues that the evolution of the treaty power in the Federal
Convention of 1787 supports the idea that the executive branch should dominate
the treaty power. 178 She maintains that, when the form of the Senate changed
because of the Great Compromise, 179 the idea of investing the treaty power in the
Senate became distasteful to the Framers because it had less of an executive
nature. 180 To support this conclusion, she relied on some debates in the state
conventions, other anti-Senate moves by the Framers near the end of the
convention (such as taking away its role in electing the President) and a belief that
171. RECORDS, supra note 169, at 185-86.
172. See RECORDS, Vol. III, 624 (1966).
173. RECORDS, supra note 169, at 336.
174. Id. at 176-339.
175. Id. at 394.
176. RECORDS, supra note 169, at 495.
177. US CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
178. See Fitzgerald, supra note 159, at 883.
179. See generally MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
91 (1913) (explaining the Great Compromise),
180. See Fitzgerald, supra note 159, at 889, 898.
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Hamilton specifically felt the treaty power was inherently executive and that the
Senate was merely a "safeguard on executive power. ' ' 8s Fitzgerald also relied on
evidence of the traditional English treaty power, in which the Crown enjoyed a
monopoly over treaty making but only Parliament could change domestic law
related to the treaties. 82
Fitzgerald's position also receives some bolstering from Convention records
that she does not cite. Delegate Mercer maintained that, "[The treaty] power
belong[ed] to the Executive department,"'' 83 rather than the legislative.
Pennsylvania Delegate Morris expressed the same view, saying that the Senate
should have no power in relation to treaties.' 84 In spite of the statements of these
delegates, however, a closer examination of the Convention records and a thorough
analysis of The Federalist appear to create a more powerful argument for a
congressional role in terminating treaties. This is especially true when one views
the statements of these Framers in the context of the ABM Treaty controversy.
D. Arguments for a Check on Presidential Treaty Power
An assertion of a congressional role in treaty termination does not question
the President's critical role in negotiating the formation of treaties. The Framers
recognized the importance of the executive's ability to negotiate treaties for the
reasons stated by John Jay in Federalist 64.
It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever nature, but that
perfect secrecy and immediate dispatch are sometimes requisite. There are cases
where the most usefull (sic) intelligence may be obtained, if the persons
possessing it can be relieved from apprehension of discovery. Those
apprehensions will operate on those persons whether they are actuated by
mercenary or friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both descriptions
who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but who would not confide in that
of the Senate, and still less in that of a large popular assembly. The convention
have done well, therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties that
although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and consent of the
senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such a manner
as prudence may suggest... Thus, we see that the Constitution provides that our
negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from
talents, information, integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and
from secrecy and dispatch on the other.1
8 5
However, even while reinforcing the necessity of executive treaty making, Jay was
careful to include the role of the Senate. Furthermore, while Fitzgerald claims that
181. See Fitzgerald, supra note 159, at 889-93.
182. Id. at 887.
183. RECORDS, supra note 169, at 297. Though Mercer qualified his position to state that, when
domestic law was affected, the treaty would have to be ratified by law, which does not appear to apply
in the case of the ABM Treaty. This is also true of Morris' position in the next sentence.
184. Id., at 392.
185. THE FEDERALIST NO. 64 (John Jay).
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Hamilton believed in a purely executive treaty power, Hamilton's own words in
Federalist 75 prove that position an inaccurate one.
Though several writers on the subject of government place that power [treaties] in
the class of executive authorities, yet this is evidently an arbitrary disposition; for
if we attend carefully to its operation it will be found to partake more of the
legislative than the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to fall
within the definition of either of them. The essence of the legislative authority is
to enact laws, or, in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of society;
while the execution of the laws and the employment of the common strength,
either for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to compromise all the
functions of the executive magistrate. The power of making treaties is, plainly,
neither the one nor the other. It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting
laws nor to thee action of new ones; and still less to an exertion of the common
strength. Its objects are contracts with foreign nations which have the force of
law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith. They are not rules prescribed
by the sovereign to the subject, but agreements between sovereign and sovereign.
The power in question seems therefore to form a distinct department and to belong
properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive... However proper or safe
it may be in governments where the executive magistrate is an hereditary
monarch, to commit to him the entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly
unsafe and improper to intrust (sic) that power to an elective magistrate of four
year's duration. 186
Of course, all of these passages refer to the treaty making power; the Framers
never directly discussed the power to terminate treaties in the Federalist or in the
Convention. Thus, in attempting to determine how the Framers would have
reacted to the ABM Treaty termination, two questions are paramount. First, why
did the Framers put the treaty power in Article II of the Constitution? This is
important, not only in how we characterize the power, but also in determining how
persuasive the Myers rationale relating to the President's power to unilaterally
remove his appointments should be in construing the treaty clause of the
Constitution. The second question is what the Framers really intended concerning
treaty termination. In answer to this question, the available evidence indicates that
the Framers would have wanted a Congressional check on President Bush's ability
to terminate the ABM Treaty, though what type of Congressional action is unclear.
1. Why did the Framers Put the Treaty Power in the Executive Branch?
While Fitzgerald argues that the Framers intended the treaty power to be
predominantly executive, Hamilton's opinion in Federalist 75, and the majority of
the other evidence available from reliable originalist sources, contradicts this
theory. The Convention termed the treaty power as purely legislative until nearly
the end of the Convention; and, even when they did move it into Article II, they
maintained the role of the Senate in making treaties.'8 7 Furthermore, analysis of
186. THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (Alexander Hamilton) (italics added).
187. See RECORDS, supra note 167, at 495.
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the Convention records indicates that the Framers did not intend this last-minute
move to be a major change in policy. They moved the provision because of
concerns about how much cumulative power the Senate had, not because of a
sudden epiphany that the treaty power should be inherently executive. In addition,
throughout the Convention, even those who wanted the power placed in the
executive qualified that desire with a commitment to legislative checks on that
executive authority, especially when international treaties would have a direct
impact on existing domestic law.
8 8
Fitzgerald's argument also encounters difficulty in the reasons some of the
delegates expressed for not wanting the treaty power vested in the legislature. For
example, Delegate Mason expressed concern about giving the Senate power as
related to the budget because the Senate "could already sell the whole Country by
means of Treaties." 8 9 Mason later clarified that his concern was that the Senate
could sell territories through treaties without action from the full Congress. 190 This
expresses less of a concern that the Executive did not have enough power, as that
the Senate had too much. Changing the provision to share this power between the
two branches, rather than giving it solely to the Senate, likely satisfied this
concern. Putting the power to make (or terminate) a treaty solely in the hands of
the executive would have caused precisely the inverse problem to the one that the
Framers were attempting to remedy by moving the treaty provision to Article 11.
This also explains the concern of many anti-Federalists, cited by Fitzgerald,
that the Senate would become an aristocracy. 19' In fact, this had little to do with
the treaty power. On September 6, 1787, Delegate Wilson noted that, with all the
powers the Senate was to have, including the Treaty power, there was a concern
that an aristocracy would result. When Delegate Morris failed to understand this
view, Mr. Williamson clarified that it came from the Senate's role in selecting the
President, which would make the President beholden to the Senate.' 92  The
Convention, of course, subsequently eliminated this power. However, the
discussion shows that concerns about the treaty power in the Senate stemmed more
from the powers that had, to that point, been given to that particular body, not a
belief that the treaty power was executive more than legislative.
In fact, while Delegate Mason expressed concerns about giving the Senate
power over the budget and treaties, it is clear that he and Morris did not want the
president to have any power over treaties. This is evident from Madison's notes of
August 7, reporting that they did not want treaties to be subject to the Executive
veto.19 3 Though they seemed to disagree on how to accomplish this in the
language of the Constitution, both agreed on the desired result.' 94 Thus, while
there were members of the convention who felt the treaty power should be
188. See id., at 297.
189. See id.
190. Id. at 297.
191. See Fitzgerald, supra note 158 at 891.
192. See RECORDs, supra note 169 at 522-24.
193. Id. at 197.
194. Id. at 197.
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executive, there were clearly those who believed that many of the state
constitutions were correct in having the power vested in the legislature.' 95 The
final treaty making power appears to be exactly what it sounds like, a compromise.
Then why did the Convention place the power within the executive article of
the Constitution with so little debate? When the final draft came back, the only
real issue questioned was whether consent should require two-thirds of the Senate
or a majority. Perhaps the best answer to this comes from the foremost authority
on the records of the Convention, Max Farrand.
It was evident that the convention was growing tired. The committee had
recommended that the power of appointment and the making of treaties be taken
from the senate and vested in the president 'by and with the advice and consent of
the senate.' With surprising unanimity and surprisingly little debate, these
important changes were agreed to. The requirement of the concurrence of two-
thirds of the senate in treaties was amended at Madison's suggestion to except
treaties of peace. It was then adopted and the next day reconsidered and re-
adopted after striking out the exception of treaties of peace.
Farrand recognized that this debate would have been more heated if it had
come earlier in the Convention. However, given the lateness in the convention and
the amount of difficulty the convention had experienced with the powers of the
Senate in general, it is not surprising that, what to us now appears as a major
change went through with little debate. It was a compromise, and one that scholars
today should not view as an endorsement of exclusive executive power over
treaties.
In addition to the policy and textual critiques of using Myers to decide the
issue of treaty termination,'9" the condition of the convention at the time it adopted
the treaty provision argues against expanding Myers to this area of law. The idea
that limits on powers given to the executive under Article II should be construed as
narrowly as possible is not evident from the Constitution itself, but is a Court-
designed method of interpretation based on form, not substance. 99 While Article
II does contain express restrictions on the authority of the executive branch, the
treaty provision entered this Article late in the Convention as part of a
compromise. The absence of a termination clause is not an indication that the
Convention meant to delegate that power to the executive branch, but was a result
of exhaustion and an understandable lack of attention to detail and all possible
scenarios. Even if one accepts the Myers interpretation of Article II in general, it
would not be reasonable to apply this doctrine broadly to the treaty provision in
light of its history.
195. See Fitzgerald, supra note 158, at 888.
196. See FARRAND, supra note 178, at 17 1.
197. Id.
198. See infra pp. 247-8.
199. See Myers, 272 U.S. at 128 (discussed, infra pp. 24-25); see also Randall H. Nelson, The
Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements by the United States: Theory and Practice, 42
MINN. L. REv. 879, 884-85 (1958).
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Despite the move of the clause to Article II, passages from The Federalist
indicate that the Framers still saw treaties as legislative in nature, though an
executive role in creating them was necessary.2°° Even if one dismisses The
Federalist, the provision itself still required the ascent of the legislative branch. It
is unlikely the Framers considered all the potential future interpretive implications
of the form it was using when it put a still-shared treaty power in Article II. Given
the evidence that the Framers did not see the treaty power as purely executive and
that its placement in Article II did not effect such a belief, it is prudent to back off
the Myers reasoning in the context of the treaty making power.
This reasoning gains support from the policy-oriented argument that U.S.
involvement in international treaties is different from a President's ability to
control his subordinates.20 ' It is important that the president be able to terminate
purely executive officials in order to fulfill his charge of executing the laws. But
even the Supreme Court recognized the limits to this broad executive power in the
case of Humphrey's Executor v. United States,20 2 where the Court held that this
unilateral power did not extend to officers whose duties were "quasi judicial or
203quasi legislative. However, if the treaty power were not a purely executive
function, using the Myers rational to resolve the issue of treaty termination would
actually defeat the intent of the Framers rather than affect it.
In sum, there is no direct evidence of why the Framers put the treaty power in
Article II. However, it happened far too quickly and suddenly near the end of the
Convention to think that it marked an abandonment of the consensus that the treaty
power, even if not purely legislative, required the legislature to play a substantial
role. While there is evidence that some delegates of the convention believed the
treaty making power was executive in nature, even these individuals desired
legislative checks on the president's authority. Furthermore, there were
individuals who believed the power was purely legislative. Hamilton's statement
above from Federalist 75 seems to indicate that the final decision was a
compromise. In any case, it only concerns making treaties. Determining who the
Framers intended to have the power to terminate treaties requires examining the
whole of The Federalist to find all allusions to treaties, and putting these
observations together to form coherent policy on international agreements.
200. For the quotation and discussion of these passages in THE FEDERALIST, see infra p. 271-74.
201. See, e.g., Scheffer, supra note 119.
202. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). In this case, the plaintiff, the
executor of an estate, filed suit against the Government for the deceased's salary from the time the
president relieved him of his duties as Federal Trade Commissioner until his death. The plaintiff
contended that the estate was entitled to the back pay because the president did not have the power to
remove the Commissioner of the FTC under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41. The
Court held that the president had violated the Act, and that the Act was constitutional.
203. See Humphrey's Ex'r, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See also Nelson, supra note 119, at 885.
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2. What was the Intent of the Framers Concerning Treaty Termination?
a. The Framers Wanted a Congressional Check
Some argue that a congressional check on unilateral presidential treaty
termination would not make sense because it would make it too difficult for the
United States to exit "international obligations. ,204  However, The Federalist
provides evidence that the Framers believed that, once the United States entered
into a treaty, it was important that it keep its bond and approach treaty issues with
2035the utmost seriousness. This was not only a consideration for the future, but was
important to the Framers as they wrote the Constitution.
The just causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violations of treaties or
from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no less than six
foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able
to annoy and injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain,
and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition, the circumstance
of neighborhood to attend to. It is of high importance to the peace of America that
she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears
evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national





204. See, e.g., Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 705.
205. The discussion that follows proves this point. However, Madison perhaps did the best job of
explaining the need for stability in the Federal government in general.
In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable government. The want of
confidence in the public councils damps every useful undertaking, the success and profit
of which may depend on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent
merchant will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows not
but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be executed? What farmer
or manufacturer will lay himself out for the encouragement given to any particular
cultivation or establishment when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors
and advances will not render him a victim to an inconsistent government? In a word, no
great improvement or laudable enterprise can go forward which requires the auspices of
a steady system of national policy. But the most deplorable effect of all is that
diminution of attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people
towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity, and disappoints so
many of their flattering hopes. No government, any more than an individual, will long
be respected without being truly respectable; nor be truly respectable without possessing
a certain portion of order and stability.
THE FEDERALIST No. 62 (James Madison).
Proponents of the termination of the ABM Treaty will quickly respond that the United States has not
broken its bond, but has terminated the treaty in accordance with the termination clause in Article XV
of the Treaty. However, as stated previously and restated in the subsequent argument, if the
Constitution does not authorize the president to terminate a treaty, than Article XV has not been legally
invoked. Furthermore, the seriousness with which the Framers approached treaty obligation is
significant to how they should be terminated, as this paper argues in its subsequent analysis on pages
268-71.
206. THE FEDERALIST No. 3 (John Jay).
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The Framers discussed the treaty power mostly in the context of Federalism,
maintaining that one national government could better maintain treaties than 13
207individual states. However, the principles applied by the Framers in their
hypothetical discussions of Federalism are applicable to the unilateral presidential
termination of treaties today. The evidence of the intent of the Framers, coupled
with standard policy and textual arguments against presidential termination make a
strong case that the withdrawal from the ABM Treaty should be more difficult to
accomplish than through the unilateral action of George W. Bush or any other
chief executive.
i. Treaties Are Part of the Supreme Law of the Land
A Congressional role in terminating a treaty, of course, does not guarantee
that the United States will maintain all of its international obligations indefinitely.
This would not a desirable result, since many treaties reach a point where they
should be terminated. Furthermore, by providing a termination clause, the parties
to the ABM Treaty acknowledged that the Treaty might not have a perpetual
life. 20 8 However, because the United States is party to the treaty, the dictates of the
Constitution are paramount, and thus the intent of the Framers is a necessary
consideration.
John Jay expressed the Framers' belief that a treaty is binding compact
207. See, e.g. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
The treaties of the United States under the present Constitution are liable to the
infraction of the thirteen different legislatures, and as many different courts of final
jurisdiction, acting under the authority of those legislatures. The faith, the reputation, the
peace of the whole Union are thus continually at the mercy of the prejudices, the
passions, and the interests of every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that
foreign nations can either respect or confide in such a government? Is it possible that the
people of America will longer consent to trust their honor, their happiness, their safety,
on so precarious a foundation?
208. It is of interest that Hamilton likely would have thought this provision to be an invitation to
trouble. He believed that it was key that treaties leave nothing to future considerations.
There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league or alliance between
independent nations for certain defined purposes precisely stated in a treaty regulating all
the details of time, place, circumstance, and quantity, leaving nothing to future
discretion, and depending for its execution on the good faith of the parties. Compacts of
this kind exist among all civilized nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and
war, of observance and nonobservance, as the interests or passions of the contracting
powers dictate. In the early part of the present century there was an epidemical rage in
Europe for this species of compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly
hoped for benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the
equilibrium of power and peace of that part of the world, all the resources of negotiations
were exhausted, and triple and quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely
formed before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson to mankind
how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which have no other sanction than the
obligations of good faith, and which oppose general considerations of peace and justice
to the impulse of any immediate interest or passion.
THE FEDERALIST No. 15 (Alexander Hamilton). However, the wisdom of the termination clause is not
the issue this paper addresses.
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between nations that the United States should not dismiss lightly.
Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode proposed, are
averse to their being the supreme laws of the land. They insist, and profess to
believe, that treaties, like acts of assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This
idea seems to be new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, and new truths,
often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect that a treaty is only
another name for a bargain, and that it would be impossible to find a nation who
would make any bargain with us, which should be binding on them absolutely, but
on us only so long and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who
make laws may, no doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not be disputed that
they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but still let us not forget that
treaties are made, not by only one of the contracting parties, but by both, and
consequently, that as the consent of both was essential to their formation at first,
so must it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed Constitution,
therefore, has not in the least extended the obligation of treaties. They are just as
binding and just as far beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now as they will
be at any future period, or under any form of government.
209
Proponents of the president's ability to terminate a treaty unilaterally will
immediately point to the fact that the ABM Treaty has a withdrawal clause that
authorizes both parties to terminate the Treaty at will with six months notice.210
Jay, obviously, did not contemplate such a clause in a treaty when he wrote this
passage. However, even if today's readers cannot read the passage literally in light
of the ABM Treaty withdrawal clause, especially the last sentence about treaties
being out of the reach of legislative acts, 21' it does serve as an illustration that the
Framers labeled treaties as the supreme law of the land for reasons other than
instructing judges that they were to supercede state law.212 Jay makes it clear that
the Framers made treaties the Supreme Law of the Land so that they could not be
"repealable at pleasure."2 '1 3
The situation concerning ABM Treaty termination justifies the fears
expressed by Jay. If the President Bush can terminate the ABM Treaty without a
congressional check, he is doing so at his pleasure. While he may or may not be
deciding to terminate the ABM Treaty on a "whim" in this particular instance, if
his legal interpretation of his powers is correct, there is no Constitutional
mechanism to prevent a president from making such a decision based more on
special or partisan interests than the merits of the treaty. 214 This is precisely what
209. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
210. See ABM Treaty, supra note 2.
211. It is likely that, with this phrase, Jay was really referring to state legislatures. This is
especially true in light of the actions of the first Congress in terminating a treaty as is recounted by the
Court of Claims in Hooper v. United States, 22 Ct. Cl. 408 (1887), see supra note 82.
212. Compare Jay, supra note 210 with Goldwater, 617 F.2d at 704.
213. Jay, supra note 209.
214. The ABM Treaty termination clause maintains that termination must be in the nation's
"supreme interests." See ABM Treaty, supra note 2. However, not all treaties will necessarily contain
such a provision, this provision is not the issue addressed in this paper, and such a clause is open to
interpretation based on partisan perceptions and interests.
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Jay maintains the Framers wanted to avoid by making treaties part of the Supreme
Law of the Land.
Jay correctly points out that a treaty is a "bargain" or contract between
nations, and that our actions in terminating a treaty will reflect on the United States
and, in part, dictate whether other nations will continue to enter agreements with us
(and, if they do, if they will trust us to honor them and, thus, honor them
themselves). If one individual has to power to terminate a treaty, how will other
nations know with whom they are reaching an agreement? After all, making an
agreement with a nation is only a valuable undertaking if you can trust that nation
to maintain it.
A role for Congress does not preclude termination, but guarantees the
representation of all citizens, states, and parties of the Federal Government in a
considered deliberative process. Jay makes it clear that the Framers did not intend
treaties to be repealable at will in the way President Bush has done, but to be
repealed in a similar manner as other laws of the United States-with
congressional authorization. This proposition gains support from other passages in
the Federalist Papers.
ii. A Check on Treaty Termination Serves to Minimize the Impact of
Partisanship
Much of the evidence that the Framers did not want the president to have
unilateral treaty termination power stems from the basic conclusion long drawn
from the Federalist papers that the Constitution, in part, was meant to minimize the
impact of partisanship. Hamilton asked,
Is it not... the true interest of all nations to cultivate... benevolent and
philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in fact pursued it? Has
it not, on the contrary, invariably been found that momentary passions, and
immediate interests, have a more active and imperious control over human
conduct than general or remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice?
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Madison and the rest of the Framers shared this fear of one party or faction
taking control over the course of the nation, and that that controlling faction would
routinely change, lending the nation to inconsistency and instability. Madison
wrote, "Among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union,
none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and
control the violence of faction.., our governments are too unstable. 2t 6
While this fear of partisan control pervades the Federalist papers, only Jay
discussed its role in the treaty power. The Framers, as noted by Jay, recognized
that faction, if given an unchecked hand, could control foreign as well as domestic
policy. Jay wrote,
215. THE FEDERALIST No. 6 (Alexander Hamilton).
216. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
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But the safety of the people of America against dangers from foreign force
depends not only on their forbearing to give just causes of war to other nations,
but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to
invite hostility or insult; for it need not be observed that there are pretended as
well as just causes of war. It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human
nature, that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect of
getting anything by it; nay, that absolute monarchs will often make war when their
nations are to get nothing by it, but for purposes and objects merely personal, such
as a thirst for military glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private
compacts to aggrandize or support their particular families or PARTISANS. These
and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of the sovereign, often
lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by justice or the voice and interests of
his people. But, independent of these inducements to war, which are most
prevalent in absolute monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are
others which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on
examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and circumstances.
'" 217
This particular except speaks of war, but the paper dealt with foreign affairs in
general, including treaties.
Giving the President unilateral power to withdraw from a treaty gives
exclusive power to terminate treaties to a single ruling party, in President Bush's
case, the Republican Party that Bush leads. By requiring action from Congress to
terminate a treaty, this executive power is controlled, but not eliminated. At the
time of the ABM termination, for example, Bush would only need to convince one
Democrat in the Senate that termination of the ABM treaty is the proper course,
and maintain his party base, in order to affect his desire to terminate the ABM
Treaty. This hardly seems an unreasonable or insurmountable check on executive
power. If the Republicans controlled the Senate as well, Bush's task would be
even easier. There are, of course, instances in which one party will be in the
majority in each branch of the government.
Even in this situation, however, a legislative check would still bring the
debate to the forefront and allow all parties in the government a formal say in the
termination process. Legislative action is not warranted in order to prevent treaty
termination through gridlock, but to ensure that the Nation and its government
debate the issue thoroughly and that the Government makes its decision in the best
interests of the entire nation. Congressional action in treaty termination would not
preclude treaty termination, but it would recognize the Framers' desire that United
States not be able to dismiss treaties on a whim, as illustrated by Jay and in Article
VI.
Treaties should be harder to vacate than by the stroke of one individual's pen,
with or without a termination clause. If partisanship on any given issue is so great
that a president cannot get a simple majority in both houses of Congress or two-
thirds of the Senate, it is clear that there is no national consensus to terminate the
treaty in that case. The United States Constitution requires this procedure to repeal
its normal statutes and Congress passes bipartisan measures on a regular basis; it
217. THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay).
VOL. 31:2
CONGRESS AND THE TREATY POWER
makes sense to require it to repeal international treaties that are part of the
Supreme Law of the Land.
The Framers put checks and balances into the Constitution to avoid the
absolute power of parties, partisans, and individual branches of the Federal
Government. 215 Such checks were necessary concerning the treaties to accomplish
the Framers' goal of improving on the monarchical system of treaty power in the
British government. Hamilton, while discussing the treaty power, observed that
under the Constitution, "there is no comparison between the intended power of the
President and the actual power of the British sovereign. The one can perform
alone what the other can only do with the concurrence of a branch of the
legislature. 21 9 Since the British Parliament had control over treaties only as they
affected the law of the land, and not foreign relations, the Senate's role of advice
and consent added a foreign relations power the legislature's role in treaties. 220 It
is difficult to believe that the Framers would have endorsed eliminating such a
check in terminating treaties.
iii. A Congressional Role in Treaty Termination Will Help to Protect
the National Character and the United States' Reputation Amongst
Nations
Action by Congress in terminating a treaty is warranted, not only because of
the importance of checks and balances on executive and factional power that Jay
pointed to, or because of the desire to check the type of executive power exhibited
by the British monarchy, but because presidents serve a term of four years, and a
maximum of ten years.221 The Senate, in particular, but also Congress as a whole
today, is a more continuous body. Some individuals are there for decades and,
even when individuals leave, there are dozens of incumbents left behind within the
body. Providing Congress with a role in treaty termination would help to assure
that the character and image of the United States as perceived by foreign powers
endures over time. Madison recognized the importance of this "national character"
as a reason for giving the Senate such a prominent role in making treaties when he
wrote,
A fifth desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is the want of a due sense of
national character. Without a select and stable member of the government, the
esteem of foreign powers will not only be fortified by an unenlightened and
variable policy.., but the national councils will not possess that sensibility to the
opinion of the world which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit than it is
to obtain its respect and confidence. An attention to the judgment of other nations
218. Obviously, not everything should require a check. The Supreme Court in Myers and the
constitution itself both recognize this. However, the preponderance of the evidence, as well as the
binding and multilateral nature of international treaties, lends credence to the argument in this case.
219. THE FEDERALIST No. 69 (Alexander Hamilton).
220. See Fitzgerald, supra note 158, at 887.
221. A president would serve the maximum if he gained the office upon the death of a sitting
president and, won the next two presidential elections.
2002
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
is important to every government for two reasons: the one is that independently of
the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on various accounts,
that it should appear to other nations as the offspring of a wise and honorable
policy; the second is that in doubtful cases, particularly where the national
councils may be warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the
presumed or known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can
be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character with foreign
nations; and how many errors and follies would she not have avoided, if the
justice and propriety of her measures had, in every instance, been previously tried
by the light in which they would probably appear to the unbiased part of
mankind?
2 2
The case of unilateral executive treaty termination embodies these concerns of
the Framers about the character and image of the Nation at their zenith. Madison
points out that, without "a select and stable member of the government" involved
in making treaties, U.S. foreign policy will be inconsistent. He finds this
particularly important because it will affect the image of the United States among
other nations. Should a president have the power to terminate a treaty without
Congress, this potential for inconsistency reaches a zenith.
For example, if President Bush were to enter a similarly formatted treaty next
week and a Democrat who did not approve of the treaty was elected president in
the next election, there would be no legal impediment to that president terminating
that treaty. The idea that a president could unilaterally erase the ABM Treaty, a
fixture of nonproliferation and a supreme law of the land, violates the theory of
222. THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison). It is interesting to note that Hamilton also saw the
importance of this national character as it related to the Senate's role in appointing and relieving
advisors to the president.
It has been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected from the co-operation of
the Senate, in the business of appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the
administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to displace as well as to
appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate, therefore, would not occasion so violent or
so general a revolution in the officers of the government as might be expected if he were
the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given satisfactory evidence
of his fitness for it, a new President would be restrained from attempting a change in
favor of a person more agreeable to him by the apprehension that a discountenance of the
Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of discredit upon himself.
Those who can best estimate the value of a steady administration will be most disposed
to prize a provision which connects the official existence of public men with the
approbation or disapprobation of that body which, from the greater permanency of its
own composition, will in all probability be less subject to inconsistency than any other
member of the government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 77 (Alexander Hamilton).
This seems to put the idea of applying the Myers rationale to the treaty power on even shakier ground,
since Myers is open to at least some measure of originalist criticism. Hamilton states that a Senate
check on the dismissal of executive officers would provide consistency and promote the national
character. He concludes that this, therefore, is a desirable characteristic of the Federal Government.
Myers maintains that this check is unnecessary in the interest of the president's power over his own
employees. If the Framers believed applying the Constitution's Congressional check on appointments
to dismissals as well, it makes no sense from an Originalist standpoint to extend the Myers rational to
the treaty provision.
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checks and balances on the power of partisans in the United States and presents an
opportunity for one man or party to damage the national character and image of the
United States the Framers hoped to promote through a legislative role in making
treaties.
Aside from these general concerns, which would apply in any case of
presidential treaty termination, there are specific reasons to be concerned about
Bush's termination of the ABM Treaty. The United States, as a superpower, will
always be subject to some criticism from other nations. The policy concerns the
Framers expressed would apply to any president's decision to terminate a treaty
unilaterally. However, in discussing the ABM Treaty Specifically, Bush's
reputation as a unilateralist appears to be having a serious effect on the reputation
of the United States in international affairs.223 While the specific criticisms vary,
most have something to do with a perceived U.S. unilateralism and a belief that the
U.S. has become "trigger-happy" since the September I I attacks.224
Even American commentators observe that, "Administration officials no
longer offer even the pretense that the U.S.-Russia relationship is a partnership of
equals. 225 Foreign commentators are less diplomatic. Many criticize the United
States by looking at President Bush's "unilateralist" moves as a representation of
the mood of the American people. For example, a commentator in Singapore
wr6te,
History will one day judge the United States' decision to withdraw from the Anti-
Ballistic Missile treaty in the same way it views today the US failure in 1919 to
join the League of Nations - as an abdication of responsibility, a betrayal of
humankind's best hopes, an act of folly... [T]he Bush administration has also
displayed a cynicism which will adversely affect the mood of cooperation that has
characterized international relations since the September I 1 attacks. It was not by
accident that the announcement came on the same day that the videotape of
Osama bin Laden, confirming his complicity in the attacks, was released. That
juxtaposition served at once to bury the ABM story, as well as provide missile
defense with an altogether spurious emotional justification to cover up its
intellectual and strategic nullity... President George W. Bush is doing well to
make the world safe from terrorism, but under the cover of that good fight, he has
223. See, e.g., US Nuclear Deception, THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Jan. 21, 2002, 1; News
and Features, Star-Spangled President, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, Jan. 19, 2002, at 32; Vincent J.
Schodolski, Blair Feeling Heat as U.S.-Europe Bridge; News, Critics Question Political Priorities,
CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 18, 2002, at 3N; Patrick E. Tyler, Russia Rejects U.S. Plan to Store Warheads, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 11, 2002, at 8A; Elisabeth Bumiller and David E. Sanger, A Nation Challenged: Dealing
with the Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2002, at Al; Martin Walker, Opinion, New Europe: Uneasy,
Necessary Ally, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 30, 2001, at G5; A Gentler America, Commentary,
THE STRAITS TIMES (SINGAPORE), Dec. 20, 2001, at 16; Suzanne Daley, Foreign Desk, The War on
Terror Finds Wary Support in France, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at A3.
224. See Michael Binyon, Overseas News, West Offers Putin Support As Criticism Grows in
Moscow, THE TIMES (LONDON), Jan. 25, 2002. Much of the criticism of the United States on the
international scene has been for not entering into multilateral treaties, such as the Kyoto Accords. The
ABM Treaty provides an example of the inverse of this common problem.
225. Witt, supra note 51.
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just made the world a far more dangerous place.
226
Criticisms such as this one illustrate how a particular leader who makes a certain
series of moves can make America's international reputation better or worse at any
given time.
A Congressional role in treaty termination will not ensure that the United
States would never face international criticism. However, it would provide a
necessary safeguard to ensure that, when the United States does make itself
susceptible to criticism from the world community, it is doing so for the right
reasons and on behalf of a clear majority of its citizens and representatives. The
character and image of the United States in the ever-shrinking world we live in is
at least as important as a small domestic spending bill. Madison and the rest of the
Framers recognized this, and the evidence indicates they would be in favor of
requiring an Act of Congress to terminate a treaty.
b. What kind of Congressional Check?
The words of the Framers, combined with the other evidence and arguments
restated in this paper and those it cites, dictate that the President does not have the
constitutional power to terminate a treaty without congressional action. However,
this does not clarify what kind of congressional action the Constitution requires. In
the Goldwater case, Judge Gasch maintained that either the consent of two-thirds
of the Senate, or an Act of Congress passed by a majority of each houses of
Congress, would suffice. Judge MacKinnon disagreed, deciding that only an Act
of Congress could accomplish the termination of a treaty. Again, originalist
analysis provides no concrete answers. The necessary and proper clause and
Article VI, section 2, read in light of the Framers' statements about treaties being
the supreme law of the land, support Judge MacKinnon's position.
In ruling that two-thirds of the senate alone could authorize a termination,
Judge Gasch, though he never explicitly said so, appears to have reasoned that
giving that body power in making treaties also gave it power in terminating them.
However, a ratified treaty is very different from one under consideration. A
ratified treaty is binding, and under Article VI, section 2, is the supreme law of the
land. The Senate has no power to repeal any kind of law on its own. However,
Article I does grant Congress as a whole that power. Thus, by the terms of the
Constitution and differences between treaties under consideration and those
already made, MacKinnon has the better position on the question.
However, there is evidence that the Framers did not want the House of
Representatives involved in making treaties. During the Constitutional Convention,
the Pennsylvania Delegation moved unsuccessfully that the House of
227Representatives also be involved in the treaty-making process. The reason for
this failure seemed to be, at least in part, that the representatives served such short
226. American Betrayal, THE STRAITS TIMEs (SINGAPORE), Dec. 15, 2001, at 1.
227. See Lynch, supra note 162, at 144.
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terms. As Jay put it,
They who wish to commit the power under consideration to a popular assembly
composed of members constantly coming and going in quick succession seem not
to recollect that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the attainment of
those great objects which require to be steadily contemplated in all their relations
and circumstances, and which can only be approached and achieved by measures
which not only talents, but also exact information, and often much time, are
necessary to concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention, to
provide not only that power of making treaties should be committed to able and
honest men, but also that they should continue in place a sufficient time to become
perfectly acquainted with our national concerns, and to form and introduce a
system for the management of them."
228
Many of the framers also expressed concerns that including the larger House of
Representatives in treaty making would jeopardize the secrecy necessary in treaty
negotiations.
The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as it relates to war,
peace, and commerce; and it should not be delegated but in such a mode, and with
such precautions, as will afford the highest security that it will be exercised by
menthe best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to the
public good.
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These concerns are inadequate to deny the House of Representatives its role in
treaty termination. First, while the members of the House serve short terms, many
are there for many years in today's House, as modem politicians tend to be "career
politicians." Furthermore, the United States now elects senators by popular vote in
the same way it elects members of the House. 230 This eliminates the main feature
the Framers used to make the Senate a more secure, enlightened body than the
House. These practical, modem-day considerations, coupled with the textual
requirement that treaties be "considered as part of the law of the land, 231 validate
Judge MacKinnon's conclusion that an Act of Congress is the proper step the
United States should take in order to terminate a treaty.
V. WHAT SHOULD CONGRESS HAVE DONE?
This paper has put forth originalist evidence and argument to supplement
standard policy and textual arguments that President George W. Bush cannot
terminate the ABM Treaty without an Act of Congress. However, even after one
accepts this argument, the question before Congress at the beginning of 2002 was
what it could do to preserve its authority. This question is likely to resurface with
future treaty terminations.
228. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
229. THE FEDERALIST No. 64 (John Jay).
230. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIt.
231. THE FEDERALIST No. 22 (Alexander Hamilton).
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A. The ABM Treaty
As I see it, the members of Congress opposed to the termination of the ABM
Treaty had four avenues they could have pursued. First, the members could have
done nothing and allow the termination to take effect. While this would not have
any definitive legal impact on the issue, it would set another, arguably a first,
precedent of unilateral presidential termination of an international treaty.
A second option was that Congress pass legislation condemning President
Bush's action and declaring that the United States may not withdraw from the
ABM Treaty. This would have created the complete impasse between the
branches that Justice Powell's deciding opinion maintained was necessary for
members of Congress to have standing. 32 Once one considers political reality,
however, it becomes clear that it was impossible for opponents to the treaty
termination to accomplish this feat.
The third option was that both houses pass legislation authorizing the
termination of the ABM Treaty. It was feasible that the leadership in Congress
could have formed a coalition of Democrats and Republicans who believed in
legislative power in treaty termination. This would have prevented a precedent in
favor of sole executive branch authority with respect to this issue. Proponents of
multilateral international agreements and legislative power in foreign affairs, by
forming what might have been an unappetizing coalition to some, would have
prevented a dangerous precedent.
The fourth option was that a handful of members sue, as was the case in
Goldwater v. Carter. On June 11, 2002, a group of representatives filed a
complaint in United States District Court for the District of Columbia seeking a
declaratory judgment that President Bush's termination of the ABM Treaty was
unconstitutional. 3 On December 30, 2002, Judge John D. Bates signed a
memorandum opinion in Kucinich v. Bush dismissing the suit on both standing
and political question grounds.234 While the plaintiffs decided not to appeal the
case, Judge Bates' decision did acknowledge that Goldwater was not controlling
and hinted that the president's authority to terminate a treaty unilaterally is
justiciable, given the proper factual circumstances. 235
B. An Option for Future Treaties
Current authority indicates that the Senate has the power, in ratifying a treaty,
to do so with conditions.236 Presumably, the Senate could assent to a treaty on the
232. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 999 (1979).
233. Electronic copies of court documents in Kucinich v. Bush are available at
http://www.lcnp.org/disarmament/ABMlawsuit/indexoflinks.htm (last visited Jan. 28, 2003).
234. Kucinich v. Bush, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24691 at *48 (D.D.C. 2002).
235. See Peter Weiss, Judge Bates'Decision In Kucinich v. Bush: Is the Glass Half Empty Or Half
Full?, available at http://www.lcnp.org/disarnament/ABMawsuit/BatesDecisionArticle.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2003.)
236. See RESTATEMENT § 303 at cmt. d.
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condition that, should the president wish to affect a termination clause in the
future, the executive would need the approval of the Congress (or a portion of the
Senate) in order to do so. Should the Senate make this a standard procedure, it
may avoid the constitutional question of treaty termination for future international
agreements.237
VI. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, neither historical precedent, the current state of U.S. law, nor the
evidence of the Framers' intent lends any strong support President Bush's
unilateral termination of the ABM Treaty. With the ever-shrinking world and the
growing importance of multilateral agreements, it is more important than ever that
the United States take its international obligations seriously. This paper has put
forth evidence that unilateral presidential termination violates founding principles
of American government.
However, treaty termination is a matter of politics as well as law. With the
current political climate, President Bush was able to achieve his goal of
terminating the ABM Treaty. Given the highly political nature of international
treaties, the record of the judiciary branch not properly addressing the issue, and a
majority of scholars moving toward acceptance of unilateral presidential
termination 238 it is of vital importance that when the Senate ratifies future treaties it
requires congressional consent of some form in their termination. This is easier
than being forced into court by the executive and, at least for treaties not yet
ratified, will achieve the same ultimate result as the Supreme Court holding that
Congress has a role in treaty termination.
There will be occasions when terminating a treaty will be necessary.
However, the United State must recognize, as its Framers did, the importance on
international agreements. The United States requires an Act of Congress to nullify
its domestic laws. It is only fitting that it requires at least an equivalent procedure
to eliminate its international ones.
237. See David A. Gottenborg, Treaty Termination and the Separation of Powers: The
Constitutional Controversy Continues in Goldwater v. Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.), 9 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 239, 258 (1980). The issue of treaty termination, of course, could still come before
the courts in treaties that the Senate has already ratified.
238. See, e.g., John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking. A Textual and Structural Defense of
Non-Self-Execution, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 2218, 2242 (1999) ("...[Today most commentators, courts and
government entities accept that the president unilaterally may terminate treaties."); Michael J. Glennon,
1997 Survey of Books Relating to the Law: 1. Constitutional Law: Process Versus Policy in Foreign
Relations: Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1542, 1544 (1997)
("The President's power to terminate a treaty without Senate or congressional approval is now generally
accepted.").
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